In this report we present a compositional network proof theory to speczfy and verify fault tolerant realttnae distributed systems. Imporiant in such systems zs the failure hypothesis that stipulates the class of failures that must be tolerated. In the formalism presented i i i this report, the failure hypothesis of a system is represented b y a predicate which eEpresses how faults maght transform the behaviour of the system. We illustrate our approach b y investigating a triple modular redundant system.
Introduction
It is difficult to prove the properties of a distributed system composed of failure prone processes, as such proofs must take into account the effects of faults occurring a t any point in the execution of the individual processes. Yet, as distributed systems are employed in iiicreasingly critical areas, e.g. to control aircraft and to monitor hospital patients, the inherently closely related fault tolerance and real-time requirements become stronger and stronger. In the Hoare style fornliilism of [4] Cristian deals with the effects of faults that have occurred by partitioning the initial state space into disjoint subspaces, and providing a separate specification for each part. In the formalisms for fault tolerance that have been proposed in the more recent literature (cf. 121, [7] provide support for reasoning about real-time issuesthe, occurrence of a fault, is modeled explicitly as an obsmvable action, typically using the designated symbol 'f'. In contrast, we suggest a more abstract approach where the eflects of faults on the externally visible input and output behaviour are modeled while the alphabets of the processes remain unchanged. In particular, we propose a formalism which abstracts from the internal states of the processes and concentrates on the input and output behaviour that is observable at their interface. As a consequence, in our proof theory we do not deal with the sequential aspects of processes. To support top-down program design our approach is compositional, that is, it allows for the reasoning with the specifications of processes without considering their implementation and the precise nature and occurrence of faults in such an implementation.
In fault tolerant systems, three domains of behaviour are distinguished: normal, exceptional and catastrophic (see [9] ). Normal behaviour is the behaviour when no faults occur. The discriminating factor between exceptional and catastrophic behaviour is the failure hypothesis which expresses how faults affect the normal behaviour. Relative to the failure hypothesis an exceptional behaviour exhibits an abnormality which should be tolerated (to an extent that remains to be specified). A catastrophic behaviour has an abnormality that was not anticipated (cf. [l] , [9] , and
[12]). Under a particular failure hypothesis for each of its components, a system is designed to tolerate (only) those antictpated component failures (see e.g. [14] for some design examples). In particular, the exceptional behaviour together with the normal behaviour constitutes the acceptable behaviour.
In [17] Schepers and Hooman developed a tracebased compositional proof theory for safety properties of fault tolerant distributed systems. In this theory, the failure hypothesis of a process is formalized as a reflexive relation between the normal and acceptable behaviour of that process. Indeed, such a relation enables us to abstract from the precise nature of a fault and to focus on the abnormal behaviour it causes. Here, we extend this proof theory to reason about real-time issues. To do so, we replace the underlying trace model by a model in which the timed, infinite traces of a process are decorated with timed refusal sets. Then, besides reasoning about progress properties, made possible by the introduction of t,ime (cf.
[8]), we can even reason about liveness and fairness issues, since we have infinite observations. The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our programming notation and the model of computation. In Section 3 we present the assertion language and associated correctness formulae. In Section 4 we incorporate failure hypotheses into our formalism. Section 5 presents a compositional network proof theory for fault tolerant real-time distributed systems. We illustrate our method by applying it, in Section 6, t o a triple modular redundant system. In Section 7 we show that the proof system of Section 5 is sound and relative complet,e. A conclusion appears in Section 8.
Real-time programming language and model of computation
Let V A R be a nonempty set of program variables, CHAN a nonempty set of channel names, VAL a denumerable domain of values, and let, TIME be some countable ordered time domain (oo E T I M E ) . PV denotes the set of natural numbers (including 0). Assume given an OCCAM-like programming language to define networks of processes that communicat'e synclironously via directed channels. This language indudes output statement, c!e to synchronously send the value of expression e on channel c , input stat'ement c?z to synchronously receive a valiir: via channel c and assign this value to vitriable I , boolean guarded command [Oy='=,bi -Pi], t,he construct PI 11 P2 to indicate parallel execution of processes PI and Pz, as wtill as, for cset C C H A N , the construct P\cwt to hide the channels in cset. As real-time programming construct we have communication guarded command
Define v a r ( P ) as the set of variables occurring in process P . Parallel processes do not, share progritm variables, i.e., for PlIIPZ we require var(P1) n var(Pz) = 0. The set of visible, or observable, input channels of process P , notation i n ( P ) , can be obtained by structural induction using zn(c!e) = 8 and iri(c?z) = { c ) . Then. zri(PIIIP2) =: m(P1)Utn(Pz) and in( P\ cset) = m ( P ) -c s e t . The set o z d ( P ) of observable output channels of process P is defined likewise, using out(c?z) = 0 and oid(c!e) = { c } .
Definition 1 (Channels of a process) The set of channels of a process P , notation chan(P), is defined by chan(P) i n ( P ) U o u t ( P ) .
0
To guarantee that channels are unidirectional and point-to-point, we require for PlIIP2 that in(P1) n in(&) = 0 and d ( P 1 ) n out(P2) = 0 . To avoid programs such as (c?t)\{c}, which would be equivalent to a random assignment to x , we require for P\cset that cset E i n ( P ) n o u t ( P ) .
We represent the synchronous communication of The model proposed there is the timed failures model; a confusing name for researchers in the fault tolerant systems community. The 'failure' refers to the fact that in this model one not only records the communications that take place but, also the failed or refused attempts due to the abseiice of a communication partner. Henceforth, we will refer to this notion as tamed observation.
A timed observation is a timed (trace, refusal) pair. A timed refusal is a set of (channel, instant) pairs. If the timed refusal of a process contains (c, T ) then this corresponds to the refusal of the process to participate in a communication on channel c at time T . 
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Assertion language and correctness foriiiulae
We use a correctness formula P sat 4 to express that process P satisfies property d, Informally, since we abstract from the internal states of the processes and focus on communication, such a correctness formula expresses that any observation of P satisfies 4. and the projection operator 7 t o form refusal expressions.
Definition 8 ( A b b r e v i a t i o n ) For some record expression rexp and a trace expression texp, rexp E texp 0 To refer to the timed observation of a process we use the special variables h and R, to denote the trace of the process, and the refusal set of the process, respectively. These variables are not updated explicitly by the process: they refer to an observation from the semantics. Then, we can write specifications such as to denote the assertion which is obtained from 4 by replacing h by trace expression texp, and R by refusal expression rfxp. Let IVA R , with typical representative t , denote the set of logical value variables ranging over T I M E , let V V A R , with t8ypical representative U , denote the set of logical value variables ranging over VAL, let T V A R , with characteristic element s, be the set of logical t8race variables ranging over T R A C E , and let RVAR, with typical element N be the srt of logical refusal variables ranging over R E F .
Definition 9 ( P r i m i t i v e predicates I)
Primitive predicates have a free variable 1 , the 'base time'. A few typical examples are:
iff there exists an i such that texp(i) = rexp. plus obvious combinations. e.g. using the connective 'aiid'. 0 I t is sometimes convenient to refer to the willingnvss of tfhe environment to communicate. For instance, a h a communication does not occur until the environr n t nt stops refusing it, we can specify precisely for how loilg a communication must be enabled by taking the willingness mentioned before into account. In particul,cr, consider the case that due to f d t s messages are lo:-t. The fact that. after hn inprit to a transmission nil,diuni, output fails to occur may in<licate either that tlir message was lost, or that no corurriunication parti i~r has come forward j e t IJsing assiimptions abut tlw readiness of the cwviroiiment to receive a nirssage e h~gan t 1 y rcsolves such issues . 
Definition 11 (Primitive predicates 11) We use a second category of primitive predicates tailored t>o tlic refusal set of the etivironnieirt. A few typical exatiiples are:
Observe that we use the present tense to refer to refusals of the process, and the past tense to refer to refusals of the environment. 0
Example 1 (Calculator) Consider process C that accepts a value via in, applies a function f t o it and produces the result via out. After an input it takes TC time units before the corresponding output becomes enabled. Once an output has occurred, a next input becomes enabled after E time units. The specification of C is shown in Figure 1 . Notice how assumptions about the readiness of the environment to communicate are used.
A Definition 12 (Channels in an assertion) Given an assertion q5 we inductively define the set chan(4) of channels such that c E chun(q5) iff a communication along c might. affect the validity of 4. We only give the most interesting cases; the rest can easily be defined by structural induction.
An assertion is interpreted with respect to a triple (e,%, y). 
Incorporating failure hypotheses
Based on a particular failure hypothesis, the set of observations that characterize a process is expanded.
Tcr keep such an expansion manageable, failure hypothesis x of process P is formalized as a predicate, expressed in a first order assertion language, whose only free variables are h , holdr R and &id, representing a reflexive relation between the normal and acceptable behaviours of P . The interpretation is such that (hold, represents a normal otrservation of process P , whereas ( h , R ) is an acceptable observation of P with respect to 1 Such relations enable us to abstract from the precise nature of a fault and to focus on the abnormal behaviour it causes. Notice that the faults that affect a process do not influence the enabledness of its environment to communicate. If, for instance, due to a failure process C is sooner than usual willing to receive new input, then still this input will not occur before t.he environment is able to provide it. We extend the assertion language with trace exprwsion term hold and refusal expression term Rotd. Sentences of the extended language are called trunsformatton expresstons, with typical representative $. To indicate that transformation expression $ h a s free variables hold, h, Rold and R we also write is equal to the ith element of h t { i n , o u t } , if the ith element of holdt{in, out} records an out communication then so does the ith element of h f { z n , out} and with equal timestamp. In the latter case the communicated value recorded in h is not specified allowing it A For a failure hypothesis x we introduce, similar to
$(hold,h, R o l d , R ) . Then, $ ' ( t e x P~~ t P x
[15], the construct ( P I X ) to indicate execution of p r e cess P under the assumption of x . This construct enables us to specify failwe prone processes, with typical representative F P . Using P to denote a process C=: X ---+ X(hold, hTchan(FP), % i d , R f c h a n ( F P ) ) 0 to be any element of VAL (see Figure 2) . Since failure prone process F P does not refuse to c0mmunicat.e on the channels not in &an( F P ) , it is also the case that communications on the channels not in chan(FPl)nchan(FPZ) are refused by FPlllFP2 if they are refused by FP1 or FP2 (see Figure 3 (a) ).
Since the interpretation of assertions has not changed, the validity of correctness formula F P sat 9 is defined as in Definition 14, with P replaced by F P . instants (see Figure 3 (b) ). FP sat 4 ( F P l X ) sat i4lx)
Compositional network proof theory
The observations of failure prone process ( F P I x )
where, for a refusal f i and a set cset of channels
~~~~( 3 , c s e t )
for i = 1,2, B t c h a n ( F P i ) = e ; , Bfchan(FP1IJFP2) = 6 , and %=!XI U%, } vc E cset .~t l , t 2
{ (0,B) I there exists a (eo,%) E O[FP] such that, for all 7, (Bo,B,fi~,R,y) i = x , Q c h a n ( F P ) = 0, and % f c h a n ( F P ) = % } C;, j = 1 , 2 , 3 , as already discussed in Example 1, ari input triplicating coinponent In, and a, component \'(der that determines the ultimate output. The intilition of the triple modular redundancy paradigm is tlint 3 identical components operate on the same input and send their output to a voter which outputs the rewlt of a majority vote. We assume that each romponent needs TC time units to apply a function f to an input value. Further we assunie that a component ni;iy transiently fail to provide output. To guarantee tlmt a failed component does not arbitrarily fast accc'pt fresh input, and hence confusi' Voter, usually a sytichronization channel sync is added. 
0
In accepts a value from the environment via channel in and distributes that value via channels i n l , in2 and in3 after TI,, time units. When all three of them have occurred In. tries to communicate via sync. E time units after this communication has been taken, it enables in again.
Voter awaits a communication via any of the channels o u t l , out2 and 02113. Upon occurrence of such a communication it starts a timer while still enabling communication via the other channels. Aft8er A time units the timer expires, and "voter time units thereafter the tentative vote is communicated to the environment via out. Thus, timing is essential as it ends the waiting for a value that got lost. E time units after this output occurs, Voter tries to synchronize via sync. When this communicat.ion is taken, it enables channels o u t l , out2 and out3 again.
Under the assumption tha,t faults do not change the rate at which a component accepts input, we formalize the hypothesis that, per round at most one of the components C1, C2, and C, fails in the way described above as shown in Figure 5 . The loss of a value In [16] we formally prove that triple modular redundant system hll((ClllCzllC3)l Loss5')ll Voter produces correct output within TI,, + Tc $-A + Tvoter time units after an input. Furthermore, we prove there that 2~ time units after an output occurs fresh input is accepted, that is, despite faults the system does not block.
= f ( v n l ( h T i n j ( i ) ) )
Crucial for this proof of correctness is the property that after synchronous input via the channels i n l , zn2, and Zn3 to process ((ClllCzllC3)2Loss11) at least two of the components will provide output within TC time units, and that if at the moment two such outputs are taken the environment does not refuse any of the out, communications, j = 1 , 2 , 3 , then all three components will accept fresh input E time units thereafter (see Figure 6 ). Due to the assumptions concerning the environment's enabledness to communicate, the proof of this non-blocking propertmy is compositional, that is, it, only uses the specifications of components C1, Cz, and C3 and the failure hypothesis (see Figure 7) .
Soundness and relative network completeness
In [16] we show that, the proof system of Section 5 is sound, that is, we prove that if a correctness forniulais derivable then it is valid. This section contains the main steps of the proof that the proof system is complet,e, i.e., we provt: that if a correctness formula is valid then it is derivable. As usual in such a completeness proof, we assume that we can prove any valid formula of the underlying logic (cf. [3] ). Thus, using t-d, to denote that assertion d, is derivable, we add the following axiom to our proof theory. As in [19] we use the preciseness preservation property to achieve relative completeness. Informally, a specification of a failure prone process is precise if it. cliaracterizes exactly the set, of observations of the process.
Definition 18 (Preciseness) An assertion Q is precise for failure prone process FP iff i ) F P sat Q iii) r$(hfchan(FP) , R f c h a n ( F P ) ) 0 Let I -P sat qh denote that correctness formula P s a t Q is derivable. Note that no proof rules were given for the sequential aspects of processes, so our notion of completeness is relative to the assumption that for a process P there exists a precise assertion 4.
This leads to the definition of network completeness.
Definition 19 (Network completeness)
Assume that for every process P there exists a precise assertion Q with I -P sat 4. Then, for a failure prone process FP and an assertion r], b F P sat r]
0
The following lemma asserts that preciseness is preserved. See [16] for the proof. 
Lemma 1 (Preciseness preservation)
Assume that for any process P there exists an assertion 4 which is precise for P and t -P sat qh. Then, for a failure prone process F P there exists an assertion 0 r] which is precise for FP and I -F P sat 11.
The following lemma asserts that any specification satisfied by a failure prone process is implied by the precise specification of that process. Since a precise specification only refers to channels of the process, and a valid specification might refer to other channels, we have to add a clause expressing that the process neither communicates on those other channels nor refuses to do so. The proof appears in [16] . Now we can establish relative network completeness.
Theorem (Relative network completeness)
The proof system of Section 5 is relatively network complete.
Proof. Assume that for every process P there exists a precise specification 4 with I-P sat 4" Then, by the preciseness preservation lemma, for every failure prone process F P there exists an assertion r] which is Assume FP sat 4. By the definition of the seprecise for F P and t F P sat r]
(1).
mantics,
hf chan(l'P) = h A RI chan( F P ) = R k FP sat Then, by ( l ) , (2) , the preciseness consequence lemma, the relative completeness assumption, and 0 ((!onsequence), l -F P sat <.
Conclusions
We have defined a compositional proof theory for fault tolerant real-time distributed systems. In this theory, the failure hypothesis of a process is formalized as a reflexive relation between the normal and acceptable behaviour of t.hat process. Such a relation enables one to abstract from the precise nature of a fault and t o focus on the abnormal behaviour it, causes. With respect to exist,ing SAT formalisms, only one new rule, viz. the failure hypothesis introduction rule, is needed. We illustrated our method by investigirting a triple modular redundant system.
An obvious continuation of the research described in this report is to find a logic t80 express fault. hypotheses more elegantsly, e.g. using the classification of failures that appears in [5].
